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DNA AS THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
FINGERPRINT: APPROVAL OF DNA 
COLLECTION UPON ARREST IN  
UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL 
Abstract: On July 25, 2011, in United States v. Mitchell, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that taking a DNA sample from a pre-
trial arrestee did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court did so by 
holding that taking DNA profiles serves only to identify arrestees, and 
thus, like fingerprinting, is an acceptable “booking” practice. Unlike fin-
gerprints, however, DNA profiles contain significant personal information 
beyond that necessary for mere identification. This Comment argues, 
therefore, that to determine the reasonableness of this intrusion onto ar-
restees’ expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, courts 
must consider both the physical DNA collection and the retention of the 
sensitive personal information in the DNA profile. 
Introduction 
 In July 2011, in United States v. Mitchell, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit became the first circuit court to rule on the con-
stitutionality of taking DNA samples from pre-trial arrestees.1 The 
closely divided court held that the government did not violate the ar-
restee’s Fourth Amendment rights by requesting his DNA sample be-
fore trial.2 
 The small number of courts to have considered whether sampling 
arrestees’ DNA is constitutional differ fundamentally in their interpre-
                                                                                                                      
1 652 F.3d 387, 390 (3d Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit, the only other circuit to con-
sider whether the DNA Act is constitutional as applied to arrestees or pre-trial detainees, 
initially upheld the expanded version of the DNA Act, but later withdrew the panel opin-
ion in anticipation of en banc review. See United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1215, 1228 
(9th Cir. 2010), reh’g granted, 646 F.3d 659 (9th Cir.), vacating as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th 
Cir. 2011). The appeal was dismissed in September 2011 because the defendant entered a 
guilty plea, and, absent live controversy, the case was moot. United States v. Pool, 659 F.3d 
761, 761–62 (9th Cir. 2011). 
2 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 391, 416. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the Fourth 
Amendment, courts generally find a search or seizure that is not supported by probable 
cause or independent suspicion to be unreasonable. See United States v. Thomas, No. 10-
CR-6172CJS, 2011 WL 1599641, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2011); People v. Buza, 129 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 753, 783 (Ct. App.), reh’g granted and superseded, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011). 
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tations of the role of a DNA sample versus a DNA profile, the scope of 
private information a DNA sample can potentially reveal, and the level 
of arrestees’ privacy expectations.3 At the heart of this debate are dis-
agreements not only over how DNA samples and DNA profiles should 
be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, but also whether both the 
sample and the profile must be considered in the analysis.4 
 The difference between a DNA sample and a DNA profile is sub-
stantial.5 On the one hand, a DNA sample is collected upon arrest, con-
tains a vast amount of personal information and in the absence of a 
clear statutory provision can be retained indefinitely.6 A DNA profile, 
on the other hand, is created from the collected sample, contains lim-
ited information primarily used for identification, and is protected by a 
number of statutory provisions.7 
 In sum, courts disagree whether taking a DNA sample can be 
analogized to a traditional identification procedure, such as finger-
printing, or whether taking a DNA sample implicates so much personal 
information that it cannot be analogized to traditional identification 
procedures.8 Without clear legislative guidance or consistent judicial 
history, the courts are forced to speculate.9 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 412–13, 423–24; see, e.g., Friedman v. Boucher, 580 F.3d 847, 
858 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding search and seizure of pre-trial arrestee’s DNA unconstitu-
tional); United States v. Thomas, No. 10-CR-6172CJS, 2011 WL 1627321, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 27, 2011) (adopting the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the federal DNA statute 
was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment as applied to the defendant, an indicted, 
but not convicted, person); Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 783 (finding requirement that felony 
arrestees submit DNA sample without independent suspicion or probable cause unconsti-
tutional); In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 492 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding 
that state statute authorizing DNA sampling from indicted, but not yet convicted, individ-
ual violates the Fourth Amendment because that individual’s privacy interest is not out-
weighed by the state’s interest in DNA analysis); see also Ashley Eiler, Note, Arrested Develop-
ment: Reforming the Federal All-Arrestee DNA Collection Statute to Comply with the Fourth 
Amendment, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1201, 1203 (2011). 
4 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407–08, 412, 420–21. 
5 See id. at 406–07, 412, 423 & n.8; see also Linda Bartusiak, Comment, Plea Bargaining 
for DNA: Implications on the Right to Privacy, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1115, 1121–22 (2011). 
6 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 406–07, 412, 423 & n.8; see also Bartusiak, supra note 5, at 
1125–26. 
7 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407, 412–13, 423–24. 
8 See, e.g., Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 767–70 (rejecting analogy between fingerprinting 
and DNA testing, reasoning that such an analogy does not account for substantial differ-
ences in the type and scope of personal information that can be obtained by each 
method); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Va. 2007) (concluding that 
analogous treatment of taking DNA samples and taking fingerprints was “widely accepted” 
and stressing the identification purpose of DNA sampling). 
9 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 422, 425. 
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 Thus, the Mitchell decision will likely be particularly influential: it 
comes from the highest court to rule on the issue and has already been 
cited in several cases.10 Yet, the Mitchell court focused narrowly on DNA 
profile use and avoided ruling on the most debated issue—uncertainty 
surrounding treatment of the DNA sample.11 The Mitchell court noted 
the vast amount of personal data contained in a DNA sample, but con-
cluded that because DNA profiles were used solely to establish indi-
viduals’ identities, they are analogous to fingerprints.12 
 Part I of this Comment provides a brief background of the DNA 
Act, introduces the Mitchell case, and outlines the Mitchell court’s consti-
tutional analysis of the Act.13 Then, Part II discusses the majority’s focus 
on the identification function of DNA profiles, a focus which reduced 
arrestees’ expectations of privacy in their DNA profiles to an interest 
only in their identities.14 Finally, Part III argues that the Mitchell analysis 
artificially focuses on the use of the collected DNA samples and dis-
misses concerns about the indefinite retention of these privacy-laden 
samples.15 This Comment argues that, to provide fair and consistent 
judicial review, congress should change the statutory language to more 
clearly delineate between different treatments of information-rich DNA 
samples and information-limited DNA profiles.16 
I. The DNA Act and the Crucial Distinction Between a DNA 
Profile and a DNA Sample 
 Ruben Mitchell allegedly lost more than forty pounds of cocaine in 
a misdirected piece of luggage on a Pittsburgh-bound, Southwest Air-
lines flight.17 After landing, he filed a lost-baggage claim.18 In March 
2009, a grand jury returned a one-count indictment against Mitchell, 
                                                                                                                      
10 See, e.g., Commey v. United States, No. 11-40164-PBS, 2011 WL 3898018, at *2 (D. 
Mass. Aug. 29, 2011); Mario W. v. Kaipio, 265 P.3d 389, 395, 399 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011); 
Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 764. 
11 See infra notes 77–98 and accompanying text. 
12 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 410. 
13 See infra notes 17–52 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 53–76 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 77–98 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
17 Joe Mandak, Feds: Calif.-based Team Flew Coke to Pa., Lost Bag, utsandiego.com (Sept. 
22, 2010 3:12PM), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2010/sep/22/feds-calif-based-team-
flew-coke-to-pa-lost-bag/. 
18 Id. 
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charging him with attempted possession with intent to distribute five 
kilograms or more of cocaine.19 Mitchell was arrested and detained.20 
 During his initial appearance before a magistrate judge, the gov-
ernment requested a sample of Mitchell’s DNA.21 Mitchell, however, 
objected to this pre-trial collection.22 The district court found that pre-
trial DNA collection constituted an unreasonable invasion of Mitchell’s 
privacy and was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, which 
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.23 The government 
appealed, and a closely divided Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
reversed.24 
 In its request for Mitchell’s DNA sample, the government relied on 
the DNA Act, which authorizes collection of DNA samples.25 Initially, 
the DNA Act required collection of DNA samples from individuals con-
victed of a qualifying federal offenses, and from “individual[s] on pro-
bation, parole, or supervised release.”26 In 2006, the scope of the DNA 
Act was expanded to encompass individuals who are merely arrested or 
facing charges.27 
 Under the Act, collected DNA samples must be forwarded to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).28 Those samples are analyzed 
and used to create limited DNA profiles, which are subsequently up-
loaded to the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).29 The FBI limits 
                                                                                                                      
 
19 United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2009), rev’d, 652 F.3d 
387 (3d Cir. 2011). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 602. 
24 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 390. 
25 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2006). 
26 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 399. 
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A); see also Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 759 (noting that 
in 2006 congress “further expanded the reach” of the DNA Act when it extended the Act’s 
application to arrestees). 
28 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(b). 
29 Id. CODIS, the Combined DNA Indexing System, is an “interconnected series of 
computerized DNA databases,” that links all of the DNA profiles created from the local, 
state, and federal laboratories. Derek Regensburger, DNA Databases and the Fourth Amend-
ment: The Time Has Come to Reexamine the Special Needs Exception to the Warrant Requirement and 
the Primary Purpose Test, 19 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 319, 328 (2009); Sonia M. Suter, All in the 
Family: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching, 23 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 309, 316 (2010). CODIS 
facilitates cooperation among federal, state, and local DNA forensic labs allowing them to 
exchange and compare stored DNA profiles electronically and identify potential suspects 
by searching crime scene samples to against existing criminal profiles. See Regensburger, 
supra note 29, at 329; see also H.R. Rep. No. 106-900 (I), at 8 (2000) (praising DNA sam-
pling as one of the “most important advances in criminal identification methods” and not-
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the information that can be stored in CODIS, and does not associate 
names or other personal identifiers with the DNA samples.30 In fact, 
CODIS can only store: (1) the DNA profile; (2) a number identifying 
the agency that submitted it; (3) the sample’s identification number, 
which is assigned at the time of sample collection; and (4) information 
identifying the laboratory technician who created the profile.31 
 The DNA Act does not specify the portion of the DNA sequence 
that should be used to create the DNA profile.32 FBI policy, however, is 
to use what is commonly called “junk DNA.”33 Absent a statutory re-
quirement, the FBI is not required to limit its use to “junk DNA.”34 
Some critics have argued, for example, that safeguards placed on the 
use of collected material cannot “immunize an impermissible search.”35 
 Under the current practice, the DNA profiles in CODIS are cre-
ated using short tandem repeat (“STR”) technology.36 STRs are re-
peated sequences of the “base pairs” of DNA, and are found at thirteen 
regions on an individual’s DNA.37 These thirteen non-genic regions are 
not associated with any known functions or traits and, thus, are referred 
to as “junk DNA.”38 
                                                                                                                      
ing that “CODIS allows State and local forensics laboratories to exchange and compare 
DNA profiles electronically in an attempt to link evidence from crime scenes for which 
there are no suspects to DNA samples of convicted offenders on file in the system”). 
30 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 400 (citing Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS and NDIS 
Fact Sheet, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Apr. 
5, 2012)); see also Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 758 (noting that DNA profiles stored in CODIS 
do not include individual names of offenders, arrestees or detainees, or any information 
related to particular cases, but only a “specimen identification number, an identifier for the 
agency that provided the sample,” and the name of the technician who conducted the analy-
sis). 
31 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 400 (citing CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, supra note 30). 
32 Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(c)(2). 
33 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 400. 
34 See id. at 424 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
35 See id. 
36 Id. at 400 (majority opinion). 
37 Id. (citing United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004)). “For exam-
ple, one person might have two copies of the first marker that are four and eight repeats 
long, copies of the second that are eleven and twenty-three copies long, copies of the third 
that are three and ten copies long, and so on through all thirteen markers.” Id. at 401 (in-
ternal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 
38 Nat’l Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence 65, 117 
(1996); see Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 400 (citing Kincade, 379 F.3d at 818); Regensburger, supra 
note 29, at 326 (“[G]enes comprise only about 3% of the total base pairs on the DNA 
molecule. Much of the remainder of human DNA consists of non-coding regions which 
have little or no apparent biological function.”). 
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 According to the government, because the DNA profile is created 
from non-genic markers, it contains only identifying information.39 
Nonetheless, although these markers are not currently associated with 
any disease or known function, they could potentially be used in future 
“screening tests” to diagnose medical conditions or obtain information 
about individuals’ family members.40 Although Mitchell argued that as 
technology progresses, scientists might be able to mine more personal 
data from these thirteen “junk DNA” markers, the court refused to fac-
tor this future and “merely hypothetical,” though not unforeseeable, 
risk in its evaluation of the DNA Act.41 The court acknowledged, how-
ever, that if future technology enabled scientists to extract more infor-
mation from junk DNA, reconsideration of the Fourth Amendment 
analysis might be appropriate.42 The court stressed that statutory provi-
sions limit the use of DNA profiles to four narrowly-defined purposes.43 
 Despite the existing statutory safeguards imposing criminal liability 
for misuse of DNA samples, samples can hypothetically be used later to 
obtain personal information beyond mere identification.44 This risk has 
prompted some courts to voice concerns that the “privacy-laden” DNA 
samples are retained by the government even after DNA profiles are 
created and uploaded in CODIS.45 Although the DNA Act provides 
                                                                                                                      
39 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 757 (citing Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1190 
(N.D. Cal. 2009)). 
40 E.g., Regensburger, supra note 29, at 330 (citing Simon A. Cole, Is the “Junk” DNA 
Designation Bunk?, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 54, 56−57 (2007)); Daniel J. Solove, Essay, Fourth 
Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1511, 1531 (2010). 
41 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 408. 
42 Id. “The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment im-
plications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.” Id. (quoting 
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010)). 
43 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3) (2006)). According to the statute, the index can 
only include information on DNA records that are maintained by federal, state, and local 
criminal justice agencies under to limited disclosure rules. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3). The 
disclosure of stored DNA samples and analyses is only authorized (A) to criminal justice 
agencies for purposes of law enforcement identification; (B) in judicial proceedings, if 
admissible otherwise; (C) for criminal defense purposes, to a defendant, “who shall have 
access to samples and analyses performed in connection with the case in which such de-
fendant is charged;” or (D) for population statistics or identification research or for quality 
control purposes but only if all personal details are removed. Id. 
44 Regensburger, supra note 29, at 391 (noting that DNA can potentially be tested for 
other purposes, such as a person’s disposition to violence or substance abuse, and arguing 
that absent any provisions for their destruction, the samples can be retained by the gov-
ernment indefinitely without protection from future abuse). 
45 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 412 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1)(A) and noting that 
the statute is silent as to how to treat the DNA sample when the offender is released from 
supervision); Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 782–83 (noting that DNA sampling of arrestee is 
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that the DNA profile should be expunged from CODIS if the arrested 
individual is acquitted or the charges are dropped, the statute is silent 
about the stored DNA sample.46 
 These concerns grew after 2006, when the scope of the DNA Act 
was expanded to include pre-trial arrestees.47 Although arrestees are 
“legally innocent,” their DNA profiles and associated DNA samples re-
main in CODIS indefinitely “unless and until [the arrestees] are able 
to successfully negotiate a lengthy and burdensome expungement 
process that is far from guaranteed to succeed.”48 
 As applied to convicted individuals, the DNA Act, has survived 
numerous Fourth Amendment challenges, concerning both DNA col-
lection and DNA analysis.49 The legal status of DNA collection from 
arrestees, however, is still in flux.50 Indeed, to date, there have been few 
challenges to the expanded Act as applied to pre-trial arrestees.51 Fur-
thermore, the few courts that have considered these challenges have 
disagreed whether the information contained in DNA profiles and 
DNA samples are protected by the Fourth Amendment guarantee 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.52 
                                                                                                                      
“problematic” and voicing concerns that DNA samples can be retained indefinitely by the 
government even if the arrestee is not convicted). 
46 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (d)(1)(A). According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s web-
site, however, although the expungement process is lengthy, it applies not only to DNA pro-
files, but also to the collected and stored DNA sample. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
CODIS—Expungement Policy, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis_expungement 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2012). The statute itself, however, references only the DNA profile stored 
in CODIS and does not address its application to the sample itself. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132. 
47 See Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 607; Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 759. 
48 Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 782–83. 
49 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 402 & n.13 (citing more than ten federal circuit cases). To 
date, every federal circuit court that has heard a convicted individual’s challenge to the 
DNA Act has upheld its constitutionality. Id. at 402; see United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 
73, 78 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007) (referring to over thirty decisions in which courts have upheld 
DNA indexing statutes); Thomas, 2011 WL 1599641, at *5 (noting that the “overwhelming 
majority” of district and state courts that considered challenges to DNA Act or similar state 
laws held that the statutes did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
50 See Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 
291, 316 n.114 (2010); see, e.g., Thomas, 2011 WL 1627321, at *1; Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
783. 
51 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 412–13, 423–24; see, e.g., Boucher, 580 F.3d at 858; Thomas, 
2011 WL 1627321, at *1; Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 783; In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 
at 492. 
52 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 390; see also U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated . . . but upon probable cause . . . .”); supra note 3 (dis-
cussing the split in the courts’ decisions). 
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II. DNA Profile: Just a Modern Fingerprint? 
 The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the right to be 
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures, absent a warrant 
supported by probable cause.53 To determine whether a government 
action violates the Fourth Amendment courts balance the degree of 
intrusion on an individual’s privacy against the degree to which the 
search was necessary to promote legitimate governmental interests.54 
This balancing of individual and governmental interests is traditionally 
considered the “key principle” of Fourth Amendment analysis.55 Under 
this balancing test, courts consider the totality of circumstances, analyz-
ing the degree to which the DNA sampling intrudes upon an individ-
ual’s privacy and the degree to which such collection is necessary to 
promote “legitimate governmental interests.”56 
 Most courts have agreed that because DNA sampling improves ac-
curacy in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases and assists 
in solving crimes, it serves important and legitimate law enforcement 
interests.57 Courts have disagreed, however, regarding the extent to 
which DNA collection intrudes on an individual’s privacy.58 For one, 
courts differ over whether arrestees have diminished expectations of 
privacy in their identities.59 Furthermore, courts disagree about the 
amount of information contained in a DNA sample.60 
                                                                                                                      
53 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
54 See Mitchell v. United States, 652 F.3d 387, 390 (3d Cir. 2011). 
55 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985). 
56 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 390, 403 (citing Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 
(2006)). The Mitchell court noted that the majority of circuits applied a totality of the cir-
cumstances approach in their analyses of the DNA Act’s constitutionality as applied to 
convicted felons. Id. at 403 & n.15. The same test was also applied in cases involving arrest-
ees and pre-trial detainees. See People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 761, 763 (Ct. App.) 
(noting that California courts usually employ a totality of the circumstances test to evaluate 
whether the warrantless search is reasonable), reh’g granted and superseded, 262 P.3d 854 
(Cal. 2011). 
57 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 404; Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 
2009). 
58 See, e.g., Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407, 422–23; Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 783. 
59 Compare Haskell, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1197−98 (noting that arrestees’ privacy interests are 
greater than those of prisoners and less than those of general population), with Mitchell, 681 
F. Supp. 2d at 607 (refusing to diminish arrestee’s expectation of privacy based solely upon 
his status as an arrestee). 
60 Compare Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 412–13 (holding that DNA sampling is nothing more 
than a more precise method of establishing identity and therefore is equivalent to finger-
printing), with Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 782 (remarking on the “extraordinary amount” of 
“stigmatizing” personal data can be obtained from a DNA sample). 
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 On the one hand, some courts have focused on the use of DNA 
samples as a means of identification, and have upheld the constitution-
ality of DNA sampling from pre-trial arrestees.61 Those courts, in con-
sidering the extent to which DNA sampling intrudes on an individual’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy have concluded that the intrusion is 
minor, implicating only an individual’s identity interest.62 On the other 
hand, other courts have found that the extraction of DNA before con-
viction is unconstitutional by reasoning that DNA samples can reveal 
extensive personal data, and that the DNA Act does not provide clear 
guidelines about sample retention.63 These courts have expressed con-
cerns over the “Orwellian prospects,” that the DNA Act raises, because 
DNA samples could potentially be retained indefinitely, and because 
the Act implicates the privacy rights of pre-conviction individuals, who 
have greater privacy expectations than convicts.64 
 Some courts have concluded that a limited DNA profile contains 
only identification information and, as a result, have analogized DNA 
sampling to fingerprinting.65 Under this reasoning, DNA profiles are 
constitutional because the use of DNA profiles is akin to fingerprinting, 
a long accepted booking procedure.66 Yet, these courts, like the Mitchell 
court, have declined to consider the privacy concerns implicated by the 
indefinite retention of the DNA sample.67 For example, in 2010, in 
United States v. Pool, the Ninth Circuit authorized the government to 
collect a DNA sample to create a DNA profile, but did not address 
whether the government could retain the sample after the profile is 
                                                                                                                      
61 E.g., Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 410; United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1228 (9th Cir. 
2010), reh’g granted, 646 F.3d 659 (9th Cir.), vacating as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011); 
United States v. Thomas, No. 10-CR-6172CJS, 2011 WL 1627321, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 
2011). In 2010, in United States v. Pool, the Ninth Circuit held that DNA sampling was used 
solely for identification and noted that there was no evidence of the government’s intent 
to use the information for any other purposes. 621 F.3d at 1228. Similarly, in 2011, in 
United States v. Thomas, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York held 
that the purpose of DNA sampling is to collect identifying information, not to “uncover 
evidence of wrongdoing or solve a particular crime.” 2011 WL 1627321, at *6. 
62 E.g., Brown v. City of Franklin, No. 3-10-1146, 2011 WL 2971092, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. 
July 20, 2011); Thomas, 2011 WL 162732, at *9; Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 
702, 706 (Va. 2007). 
63 E.g., Mitchell, 652 F.3d 423–24 (Rendell, J., dissenting); Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
780, 783. 
64 E.g., Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 780, 783; In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 491 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
65 See, e.g., Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 413; Anderson, 650 S.E.2d at 705, 706. 
66 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 413. 
67 See, e.g. Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 412; Pool, 621 F.3d at 1233 (Lucero, J., concurring). 
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created.68 Other courts, however, have concluded that “complex, com-
prehensive and inherently private information” contained in such sam-
ples is entirely unnecessary for identification purposes and any com-
parison to fingerprinting is “pure folly.”69 
 The Mitchell court declined to consider concerns about the poten-
tially indefinite retention of the DNA sample, in part, because Mitchell’s 
DNA sample had not yet been collected, precluding him from challeng-
ing its retention.70 Although the court acknowledged that a “vast 
amount of sensitive information” can be extracted from the DNA sam-
ple, it found such concerns speculative and was “reassured by the nu-
merous protections” created by the legislature.71 For example, the DNA 
Act limits the use of DNA profiles and criminalizes any mistreatment of 
either the DNA sample or DNA profile.72 The Mitchell court found that 
these criminal penalties substantially curbed any hypothetical abuse.73 
 Furthermore, in Mitchell, the Third Circuit framed the inquiry 
around whether pre-trial arrestees have expectations of privacy in their 
identities—an interest upon which law enforcement is permitted to in-
trude as part of routine booking procedures, such as fingerprinting.74 
The Third Circuit only briefly addressed the private information con-
tained in DNA samples, and relied on the statutory safeguards to pro-
tect against the samples’ misuse.75 In doing so, the court did not con-
sider whether privacy interests of pre-trial arrestees differ from those of 
convicted felons.76 
III. Unjustified Distinction in the Treatment of DNA Samples 
and DNA Profiles Distorts Courts’ Analyses and  
Ignores Important Privacy Concerns 
 The Mitchell court broadly expanded the scope of information 
available to the government, and became the first federal circuit court 
to rule that DNA testing of pre-trial arrestees does not violate the 
                                                                                                                      
68 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1232 (Lucero, J., concurring). 
69 See Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 608; see also Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 783 (comment-
ing that due to the very nature of DNA analysis, DNA tests cannot be used to immediately 
identify the suspect and finding DNA sampling without probable cause unconstitutional). 
70 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 412. 
71 Id. at 407. 
72 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 14135e(c)); see also supra note 43 (discussing statutory limits 
on the use of DNA profile). 
73 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407. 
74 See id. at 390. 
75 See id. at 409–11. 
76 See id. 
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Fourth Amendment.77 The court reached this conclusion by focusing 
only on the use of collected DNA samples as a means of identification.78 
Yet, in doing so, the court dismissed concerns about the information 
contained in the DNA sample itself.79 Furthermore, it extended the 
application of the DNA Act to arrestees, who have higher privacy ex-
pectations than convicts, and declined to address the government’s po-
tentially indefinite retention of DNA samples.80 
 The entire DNA sample remains in the government’s custody, 
thereby opening up an “unquestionable opportunity for abuse.”81 The 
Mitchell court briefly acknowledged the wealth of private information 
that can be obtained from DNA samples.82 The court stressed, the 
speculative nature of concerns arising from the potential wealth of in-
formation available to the government.83  Furthermore, according to 
the court, statutory provisions that impose strict criminal sanctions for 
the misuse of DNA samples are sufficient to curb abuse.84 Yet, statutory 
provisions may change in the future and imposition of criminal liability 
does not always guarantee against misuse.85 Furthermore, the Mitchell 
court did not address the extent of personal information contained in 
the DNA sample.86 Nor did it consider the implications of the samples’ 
potentially indefinite retention.87 Instead, the court upheld the DNA 
Act based merely on its approval of DNA profiles’ function.88 
 Instead of merely considering the DNA profiles, courts should 
consider both the DNA sample and the DNA profile to analyze the pri-
vacy concerns raised by DNA sampling.89 The court’s focus on the DNA 
                                                                                                                      
77 652 F.3d 387, 390, 402 (3d Cir. 2011). 
78 See id. at 411–12. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. at 412. 
81 See United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1232 (9th Cir. 2010) (Lucero, J., concur-
ring), reh’g granted, 646 F.3d 659 (9th Cir.), vacating as moot, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011); 
see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004) (noting that the government can 
not always be trusted to safeguard individuals’ rights). 
82 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 407. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 See id. at 423–24 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
86 See id. at 407 (majority opinion). 
87 See id. at 412–13. 
88 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 412–13. 
89 See infra notes 90–98 and accompanying text. 
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profile and its identification function ignores that the DNA sample im-
plicates private information far beyond an individual’s identity.90 
 Although the use of DNA profiles can be compared to the use of 
fingerprinting, which arrestees are already subjected to during routine 
booking, DNA profiles impose a substantially greater intrusion.91 “Pri-
vacy-laden” DNA samples are not destroyed once DNA profiles are cre-
ated and could potentially be used to obtain sensitive personal informa-
tion beyond that necessary for identification.92 Furthermore, although 
some have argued that the government has neither the time nor the 
funds to conduct in-depth analyses of DNA samples, those practical 
limitations are not sufficient to make the statute constitutional.93 The 
limits currently imposed on the use of collected DNA does not “immu-
nize” the government from the constitutional requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment.94 
 Although some courts have limited their constitutional reviews by 
only considering the identification function of DNA profiles, courts will 
continue to disagree as long the constraints on DNA sampling remain 
ambiguous.95 Thus, in addition to statutory penalties for improper use 
of information, the government should introduce further restrictions 
on the analysis of DNA samples collected from arrestees prior to trial.96 
 A statutory provision for the automatic deletion of collected DNA 
samples on dismissal of charges would help prevent potential abuses of 
the vast amount of information that can be mined from “privacy-laden” 
DNA.97 Although some scholars argue for a policy prohibiting analysis 
of collected DNA samples until the arrested individual is convicted, 
                                                                                                                      
90 Corey Preston, Note, Faulty Foundations: How the False Analogy to Routine Fingerprinting 
Undermines the Argument for Arrestee DNA Sampling, 19 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 475, 498 
(2010). 
91 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 412–13. 
92 Id. at 424 (Rendell, J., dissenting)(arguing that because even “junk DNA” used in a 
DNA profile might contain “extremely private and sensitive information,” it is unwise to 
focus solely on the government’s claim that the data is used only for identification pur-
poses). The Mitchell dissent further compared DNA sampling to seizure of personal medi-
cal records, and noted that focusing only on the use of the extracted information is similar 
to concluding “that if the Government seizes personal medical information about you but 
can only use the subset of that information that serves to identify you, your privacy interest 
in the information taken is confined to a mere interest in your identity. Nothing could be 
further from the truth.” Id. 
93 See Regensburger, supra note 29, at 331. 
94 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 416 (Rendell, J., dissenting). 
95 See Preston, supra note 90, at 505−06. 
96 See Eiler, supra note 3, at 1236. 
97 See Paul M. Monteleoni, Note, DNA Databases, Universality, and the Fourth Amendment, 
82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 247, 257−58 (2007). 
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such a policy would provide only temporary privacy protection, fails to 
address long-term dangers associated with retention of the DNA sam-
ple, and downplays the important role DNA profiles can play in pre-
trial decisions.98 
Conclusion 
 In Mitchell, the Third Circuit became the first federal circuit court 
to uphold the constitutionality of the DNA sampling of pre-trial arrest-
ees. The court did so by limiting the inquiry to the arrestees’ privacy 
interest in their identities, and by holding that DNA profiles served ex-
clusively identification purposes, similar to fingerprinting. The court’s 
decision, however, did not address concerns about the extensive per-
sonal information that can be mined from the indefinitely retained 
DNA sample. 
 Thus, application of the Third Circuit’s approach is bound to pro-
duce different results among the courts, because courts continue to 
disagree about whether it is proper to reduce collection and retention 
of the DNA sample itself to the identification function of the limited 
DNA profile. Indeed, the Third Circuit limited its review to the use of 
the DNA sample without giving proper weight to the fact that DNA 
samples themselves can serve purposes beyond identification. 
 Changes to the language of the DNA Act as it pertains to arrestees 
would reduce the potential for abuse of privacy-laden DNA samples. 
Provisions for automatic destruction of the DNA sample if the arrest 
does not result in a conviction or after a limited DNA profile has been 
created, might prevent arrested individuals, presumed innocent at the 
time the DNA sample is obtained, from being exposed to the collection 
of personal information far exceeding mere personal identification. 
Irina Sivachenko 
 
Preferred citation: Irina Sivachenko, Comment, DNA as the Twenty-First Century Finger-
print: Approval of DNA Collection upon Arrest in United States v. Mitchell, 53 B.C. L. Rev. E. 
Supp. 249 (2012), http://bclawreview.org/e-supp/2012/20_sivachenko.pdf. 
                                                                                                                      
98 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 420 & n.4 (noting that whether an arrestee has been previ-
ously implicated in crimes and as a result poses a threat to the society is an important fac-
tor in courts’ bail decisions). 
